INTRODUCTION: FOOD-SAFETY POLICY AND EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS
Contributors to the current debate on the future of the European Union (EU) disagree on many things, but one thing appears to be widely agreed: the EU should play a bigger role in international affairs. Not least under the impression of more or less severe crises, areas such as energy, climate change, and immigration have been included in recent calls for expanded global activities. Only by joining forces and "speaking with one voice" on the international stage, the reasoning goes, will EU countries be able to defend their interests in the face of economic globalisation and other developments, which are far beyond the control of individual states. From the history of European intergration, however, it is clear that in foreign policy high-flying expectations are often not matched by relevant capabilities at EU level. Member states have been much more hesitant when it comes to delegating power over external relations to supranational institutions than if such delegation concerns (previously) domestic policies. This is hardly surprising, given the central role which the autonomous conduct of foreign policy plays in traditional concepts of statehood and sovereignty.
The notion of the "capability-expectations gap" has been coined with a focus on the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), i.e. in an area where the means of conducting foreign policy are especially costly and sovereignty issues are especially notorious (Hill 1993) . In issue areas traditionally considered to be "low politics", one might expect the gap to be smaller. And indeed, at the other end of the spectrum of EU foreign relations, external trade policy has -with some exceptions -been conducted at EU rather than at member-state level for several decades. The goal of creating a customs union, together with the general prohibition of internal barriers to trade, made it virtually impossible not to have a common external trade policy, too.
Both the CFSP and external trade policy are obviously very important. However, the bulk of EU external activities belongs to neither of these two "extreme" categories, but rather to a large and somewhat underexplored area inbetween, which encompasses the external dimension of various internal, predominantly (but not exclusively) regulatory policies of the EU. 1 Food-safety policy, which regulates the conditions under which foodstuffs can legally 1 The predominance of regulatory policies in the EU's portfolio of activities famously led Majone (1996) to conceptualise it as a "regulatory state". Although for good reasons this remains a contested concept (Eberlein and Grande 2003) , I have borrowed it for the title of this paper, firstly because I deal with one of those policies to which Majone's conceptualisation refers, and secondly because, although the EU remains far from being a state in the traditional sense, its increasing involvement in international affairs, be produced and placed on the market, is a case in point on which this paper focuses. Alternatively, one could for example refer to public-health policy more broadly conceived, or to environmental policy. In these and in several other areas, the acquis communautaire encompasses many detailed legal provisions which, although they are directly addressed to actors within the EU, have important indirect consequences beyond its borders. Among the mechanisms which create such consequences, international trade remains an especially important one. Thus for exporters from non-EU countries, European food regulation can constitute a significant "non-tariff" barrier to trade, if it diverges from, and in particular if it is more stringent than, relevant regulation in the exporter's home country. At the same time, in all these areas there are more or less far-reaching international treaties and organisations, which attempt to influence the policies of their contracting parties. Food-safety policy is an interesting case also in this respect, for unlike in the more extensively researched field of environmental regulation, a single multilateral organisation in charge of setting relevant international standards has been in existence for over forty years now, namely the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) of the United Nations (UN), which thus creates a particular opportunity structure for the conduct of external food-safety policy.
Unlike external trade policy, however, the external dimension of European food-safety policy until recently remained within the domain of member-state competence. This situation changed in 2003 when, after ten years of internal and external negotiations, the European Community (EC) 2 joined the member states in becoming a full member of the CAC in its own right -one of very few international organisations where it has gained this status. 3 The remainder of the paper traces the process which led to the EC's accession to the CAC, and it begins to assess the consequences of this accession, to the extent that these have become visible during the first three years of membership. In particular, subsequent sections address the following questions: What does the CAC do, why did EU actors want to join it, and how was the target reached in the face of considerable scepticism among both EU and especialy the membership in international organisations, makes it more state-like in important respects (see also Tiilikainen 2001 on this second aspect). member states and other CAC members (2.)? What are the legal and institutional terms of EC membership in the CAC, how is a coordinated EC position normally arrived at in the CAC, and what happens if routine coordination processes fail (3.)? And what, if anything, has changed as a consequence of membership for "vertical" relations between the EU and its member states, and for "horizontal" relations with other international actors (4.)? The concluding section (5.) reviews the main findings and reflects on their applicability to other areas of EU external relations.
In terms of methods and materials, the analysis largely relies on official documents, by far the biggest part of which is publicly accessible on the internet, whereas a small number has been released (at least partially) upon my explicit request to the EU institutions concerned, 
WHY AND HOW THE EC BECAME A CODEX MEMBER

Codex and its role in global food-safety governance
The Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) was created jointly by the UN Food and Ag- . In addition to applying the general WTO principle of non-discrimination, whereby imported goods must not be subjected to stricter regulatory requirements than domestically produced goods, the SPS Agreement also obliges WTO members to base their national food-safety policy measures on a scientific assessment of health risk, the characteristics of which are further specified in the Agreement. Unless measures are based on such a risk assessment or conform to internationally harmonised food standards, such as those set by the CAC, they are open to challenge before the powerful WTO dispute settlement institutions, if they can be shown by other members to have negative impacts on international trade. Thus if they cannot scientifically demonstrate the need for nationally specific trade-impeding food-safety measures, WTO members are virtually obliged to adopt Codex standards in trade-sensitive areas, unless they want to risk ending up "in court".
Codex standards -and related Codex texts such as guidelines or codes of practice -cover a very wide range of internationally traded food products. Altogether, there are now more than 400 Codex standards and related texts (guidelines and codes of practice), many of which have been repeatedly updated and amended. 6 Final responsibility for the setting, updating and amending of Codex texts lies with the plenary of the CAC, which is in session either in Rome (at the FAO headquarters) or in Geneva (at the WHO) for one week every year (prior to 2003 every other year). The substantive negotiations on standards and related texts, however, are conducted in the framework of about two dozen subsidiary bodiesspecialised committees and task forces, which are hosted and funded by individual Codex member countries. Most of these also meet physically once per year, but delegate the drafting of texts to physical and electronic working groups which interact more frequently. Scientific input for the work of the CAC and its subsidiary bodies comes from a handful of expert committees, which are managed not by the Codex but directly by its parent organisations, FAO and WHO, and remain institutionally independent from the Codex itself.
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Statutes of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, Art. 1(a) (CAC Procedural Manual, 15 th English ed., p. 3). For an overview of the Codex and its history, see Victor (1998: ch. 3 ); for analysis of recent attempts to improve its functioning, Hüller and Maier (2006) .
Pre-accession negotiations inside the EU
For most of the Codex's life to date, the EU's individual member states were Codex members but the Union or the Community as such was not. The EC, represented by the European Commission, participated in Codex meetings as an observer, but in that capacitylike all Codex observers -it was entitled to speak only if invited by the chair, and after all the Codex members had spoken; it was not entitled to vote either. This is not an uncommon situation for EC representation in international organisations more generally (cf. Wouters and De Meester 2005: 12-14) , but it was obviously unsatisfactory from the Commission's point of view. It was potentially confusing also for other, non-EU Codex members, insofar as it created the impression of persistent national competencies, while foodsafety legislation in fact was increasingly harmonised within the EU.
Already in the mid-1980s some attempts were made to revise the legal and practical conditions of EC participation in the Codex (Fondu 1987: 46) . A major opportunity for further change arose in 1991, when the EC joined one of the Codex's mother organisations, the FAO -the first "significant" international organisation ever to which it acceeded as a member in its own right, after four years of negotiations (Sack 1995 (Sack : 1237 . The FAO was chosen as a "test case" for EC membership in international organizations because of its technical but nonetheless important nature and because of the extent of relevant EC competence, especially (at that time) in the framework of the common agricultural policy (Sack 1995 (Sack : 1246 . In purely legal terms, membership in the FAO would already have entitled the EC to become a Codex member, too; a simple declaration of intent, addressed to the Director-General of FAO or WHO, is sufficient for members of either of these organisations to join the Codex. 7 The possibility of EC membership also in the Codex was explicitly mentioned in the context of its accession to the FAO, and in accordance with Article 300 of the EC Treaty, in January 1994 the Council indeed authorised the Commission -in consultation with a designated working group of the Council -to negotiate the conditions and the modalities of the EC's accession to the Codex. 8 The case for accession was further strengthened when the WTO Agreement entered into force in 1995. Generally speaking, the increased relevance of Codex standards in the context of WTO law (see above, 2.1) provided an additional incentive for EU member states to organise their participation in the Codex in the most effective way possible. In addition, the 7 CAC Statutes (fn. 5), Art. 2. The EC is not a member of the WHO, hence the route via the FAO is the obvious one to take. ally also the CAC plenary had agreed to set standards for the bovine growth hormones in question, thus declaring them to be safe as long as maximum residue levels are complied with. 14 Not least for this reason the complete ban applied by the EU to these hormones was considered inconsistent with the SPS Agreement by the WTO dispute settlement bodies, and the complainants (US and Canada) were authorised to impose trade sanctions on the EC. 15 The EU member states and their allies had won a first vote on this issue in the CAC in 1991, but in 1995 they failed to prevent a majority for the proposed hormone standards.
In 1999 the EU member states again failed to prevent the CCRVDF from adopting maximum levels for a similar substance, bovine somatotropin (BST).
Citing the BST experience as yet another reasons to seek EC accession to the Codex, the 24 The final agreement (in more detail below, 3.1) indeed gives member-state delegates the right to intervene -but not to vote -on matters of exclusive EC competence; in this respect it is slightly more "intergovernmental" than the FAO model which it otherwise follows (see fn. 37). One member state -not identified in the accessible part of the Council document -proposed a series of further amendments, in particular with a view to preventing the Commission from speaking or voting on behalf of the EC in the absence of previously agreed common negotiating position 25 , but only one of these amendments was included in the eventual agreement in a weaker form.
Thus major concessions were not gained by the member states in this final phase of the in- 21 Rapport intermédiaire (fn. 10), p. 5. ternal preparations, but the schedule for accession was considerably strained. 
Accession negotiations in the Codex
Amendments to the Rules of Procedure, which would allow accession of the EC to the Codex, were first discussed in the Committee on General Principles (CCGP) in April 2001.
These amendments referred to the membership of "regional economic integration organisations" (REIOs) in general, rather than the EC in particular. 27 
HOW THE EC OPERATES AS A CODEX MEMBER
Terms of EC membership in the Codex
The terms of EC membership in the Codex, as agreed in the lengthy negotiating process recounted above, follow the example of its membership in the FAO in most respects. tions (see Table 2 below). This may have helped to arrive at a more consistent use of lan- 
Internal coordination between member states and Community institutions
It is one thing to determine that the distribution of competence justifies a "Community po- The rules which were set up in the process of acceeding to Codex determine not only the division of competence, but also a procedure for arriving at a coordinated EC position in substantive terms. 52 The flow chart in Annex A (below) graphically depicts this process.
The Codex Secretariat kicks it off by distributing to all members the draft of a Codex standard or related text, as agreed by the preceeding session of the Codex committee in charge.
Fifty to sixty of these "Circular Letters" are distributed every year across the different committees, in most cases containing a request for comments on the draft by a certain date.
In Codex Secretariat for distribution to the other Codex members. In most cases the final EC position paper is also published on the internet for the information of stakeholders and the general public. 53 The entire procedure can sometimes take up the biggest part of the time which passes between two Codex committee meeting (i.e., close to one year). But if Circular Letters are issued closer to an upcoming meeting than to the preceeding one -e.g., because they result from working group discussions held between two meetings -the time available for the coordination procedure can be cut down to several weeks, which obviously puts considerable time pressure on all participants.
In order to respond to developments during Codex meetings, and to conference-room documents submitted by other Codex members and observers, further coordination meetings between the Commission and member states take place on the spot during each meeting, usually early in the morning and additionally during lunch or coffee breaks in urgent cases. In the latter case, the ad-hoc character of these meetings can hardly be exaggerated.
Depending on the distribution of competence, either the Commission or Presidency calls upon member-state representatives available in the room and tries to get oral agreement on the negotiating position it intends to shift to. As a rule, however, only minor shifts in position are determined in this ad-hoc way. If major shifts are required to agree to an emerging consensus in the Codex committee, the EC has to ask for postponement of the decision until the next meeting of the committee (normally the following year) and once again feed the revised draft text through the coordination machinery.
Coordination at its limits
For most of the three years (2004-06) during which the EC has now been a Codex member, the procedure described above has worked quite effectively, in terms of actually producing a coordinated position. During that time close to 50 meetings of the CAC and its subsidiary bodies have been prepared in this way. Normally there are 10 to 15 items on the agenda of each meeting (sometimes more than 20), and even if a coordinated position is not prepared for every single item, the output of the coordination procedure amounts to many hundred commonly agreed position papers during that time. 54 Among these there is a total of only three cases in which agreement was not reached in the Working Party but required the intervention of higher decision-making bodies -specifically, the Coreper whose intervention is foreseen in this case. 55 A somewhat closer look at two of these three exceptional "hard cases" will help us determine the limits of the coordination procedure.
The first big stir in the Codex coordination process was caused by the "parmesan" incident, just a few months after the EC had become a member. It concerned the question, on the agenda of the Codex Committee on Milk and Milk Products (CCMMP), of whether a new global -i.e., Codex-wide -standard for parmesan cheese should be developed or not. This issue is less about food safety, strictly speaking, than about quality characteristics of a food product. Italy in particular wants the name "parmesan" to be associated as closely as possible with the Parmigiano Reggiano cheese traditionally produced in its Emilia Romagna region. Producers of more or less similar types of cheese from other parts of the world, in particular from the US, want to market their product as "parmesan", too, thus using it as a generic name. Intra-European coordination was particularly difficult here because there are 54 Some Codex agenda items actually cover several different issues, for each of which a separate position paper may then be prepared. 55 . 55) , p. 6. The report at this juncture also refers to the third, less salient case concerning maximum levels of accidental nuclear contamination of foods, where the proposed categorisation as case of Community competence was also contested by Germany but ultimately confirmed by Coreper. in general by the Contaminants Regulation, which provides for specific maximum levels (MLs) to be set by way of Commission Regulation (i.e., in a Comitology procedure). 64 The recent conflict specifically concerns a Codex standard for aflatoxin MLs in various sorts of tree nuts (hazelnuts, almonds and pistachios). 65 To understand the issues that strained the European Codex process, we need to look at the international context first. This issue turned out to be a very difficult one, not least because recent scientific analyses can be read to entail that even the existing EU standards are not stringent enough to avoid health damage from the consumption of nuts, given the increasing amounts of these eaten in several EU countries. 69 On more general grounds, several member states recalled in the Working Party that aflatoxins had been categorised by the relevant scientific body at UN level as genotoxic carcinogens, meaning that for these substances it was actually impossible to set a level below which their consumption poses no health risk at all. 70 If an ML was set nevertheless, they argued, it should at least not exceed the existing one. The Commission, supported by several other member states, instead insisted on the need to avoid the worst case of simply being outvoted and ending up with Codex levels 50% (15 as opposed to 10 µg/kg for unprocessed nuts) or even 150% (10 as opposed to 4 µg/kg for processed ones) above EU levels. It also observed that the EC was already perceived by many other Codex members, especially developing countries, as using food-safety regulation for protectionist purposes, and that it ought to aim at greater coherence between its food-safety and development-assistance policies. negotiating position on the aflatoxins issue, and for not letting it be determined exclusively by existing EU law. 72
Several roundabout or procedural solutions were discussed in the Working Party, such as agreeing to less stringent Codex levels on the condition that they be reviewed within a fixed period of time; requesting a new risk assessement from JECFA before agreeing to any levels at all; or offering additional technical assistance to nut-exporting developing countries, so as to make it easier for them to meet the EU levels. The Commission insisted, however, that none of this would suffice to prevent the Community from losing out in the CCFAC and CAC, while several member-state delegations conversely insisted that their mandates did not allow them to agree to a negotiating position significantly above the current EU limits. When the Working Party was still unable to agree on a position one month before the CCFAC session decisive to be decisive, the Commission took this issue to the Iranian and some other delegations, the subsequent CAC meeting followed the CCFAC and advanced the 8 µg/kg ML for processed nuts to the next step in the Codex standardsetting procedure. 76
WHAT CODEX MEMBERSHIP HAS CHANGED: "VERTICAL" AND "HORIZONTAL" PERSPECTIVES
We have seen above that different European and international actors each had their particular concerns and expectations with regard to EC membership in the Codex. Whereas the Commission had an obvious interest in being able to act on behalf of a Codex member, rather than just an observer, member states were anxious that their role would be down- would become vulnerable to charges of neglecting its duty of loyalty towards the Community -if not legally (fn. 60), then at least morally speaking.
At the same time, the value of individual member states' freedom to dissent from the common position is of little value, if it means being defeated all the more easily in the Codex. The parmesan and aflatoxins cases differ in this respect. In the parmesan case, the dissenting member states were closer to the median position in the Codex committee than the offical EC position was. In theory, at least, they could thus have contributed to creating a "consensus" on their own position (or somewhere close to it) in the Codex, to the detriment of the majority of EU member states. Quite likely it was precisely this danger that led the Commission and the Coreper to condemn the dissenters so strongly. In the aflatoxins case, by contrast, the dissenting member states were even further away from the Codex median than the majority of member states was. In terms of international outcomes, they would have had nothing to gain whatsoever from "going it alone". However, by holding out on an Things quickly get rather complicated if we try to keep all these different concerns and constellations in mind. But the basic trade-off is clear enough, and it is inherent in all instances of European integration, whether they concern internal or external policies. On one hand, member states can generally increase their policy-making leverage by joining forces and, specifically in external relations, by "speaking with one voice" to their interlocutors from other parts of the world. On the other hand, unless preferences among member states are entirely homogeneous, agreeing on a common position to be presented to the outside world necessarily means that not all member states' preferences will be reflected to the same extent in this position. 77 Generally speaking, the simplest way of handling this trade-off is to restrict the common position to the "least common denominator", i.e. include only those elements which are consistent with every single member state's preferences. In the EU's external regulatory relations (and in foreign food-safety policy in particular), the existing EU (food) law fulfills a somewhat similar function. Where a European standard already exists in an area under discussion in the Codex, this standard almost automatically constitutes the EC's default negotiating position. Given that most EU food law is now adopted in the codecision procedure, involving qualified-majority voting in the Council and a strong role for the European Parliament, it is far from limited to the least common denominator of member-state preferences. Nevertheless, it is very rare that -as in the parmesan case -an existing EU stan- erence to incomplete scientific data as well as a more confrontational course, whereby nutexporting countries would have been challenged to demonstrate that the strict EU levels 77 For an analysis of this trade-off in more formal terms, see Frieden (2004) . 78 And even in the parmesan case, it was not the relevant Regulation as such that was questioned by the dissenting member states but rather its application to a particular product. 
The EU and other global actors
In its above-mentioned report on the first two years of Codex membership, the Commission notes a "fruitful harvest" of EC membership and "an overall strengthening of the influence of both the Member States and the EC in the Codex". 81 The above-mentioned cases of conflict cast some doubt on the possibility of always creating such a win-win situation, and instead highlight the potential trade-off involved in joint external representation. It is nevertheless worthwhile probing whether external influence has indeed in- 79 For a recent example see Maier (2007: 11-12) . 80 See the FSA discussion paper mentioned above (fn. 69).
81 Two-year Report (fn. 55), pp. 8-9 -emphasis added.
creased. For if this was generally the case, individual instances of having their own preferences overriden in the coordination process would be much easier to bear for member states.
Unfortunately, the effectiveness of external representation is far from straightforward to conceptualise and measure. The evidence that is mostly used for this purpose consists of a relatively small number of high-profile cases of international conflict, many of which pit the EU against the US. The question then becomes one of assessing who "wins" in these conflicts. In the hormones case the EU famously "lost" first in the Codex, and subsequently in the WTO. During the more recent period under investigation here, most attention has been gained by the transatlantic conflicts over the institutionalisation of the precautionary principle and, partly related to that, the regulation of genetically-modified (GM) food. A brief look at the former conflict will suffice to demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of this approach to measuring international influence. 82
The precautionary principle was most directly at issue in the context of Codex negotiations aiming at the formulation of guidelines for risk analysis. 83 A first set of guidelines ("Working Principles"), to be applied by the various Codex committees, was agreed in 2003, just before the process of EC accession was completed. 84 The text of these guidelines can hardly be considered a great success from the EC's point of view, given its very hesitant embrace of the precautionary principle (not even mentioned explicitly as such in the guidelines), for the inclusion of which the EC and several of its member states had fought in the process (see also Poli 2004: 619-22; Veggeland and Borgen 2005: 695-7; Post 2006 Post : 1264 . A second, related set of risk-analysis guidelines, to be applied by Codex members "at home", has been under consideration in the CCGP and has also created debate on the precautionary principle, the inclusion of which in the guidelines is still considered a European "key interest". 85 This latter set of guidelines thus constitutes a promising case for a "be- Working Principles, which declares "precaution" (but not the "precautionary principle") to be "an inherent element of risk analysis". 86 The EC (then still an observer) and memberstate negotiators tried in vein to have a stronger formulation included in the 2003 guidelines but in the meantime have apparently accepted this formulation as a good enough compromise; in any event they expressed their satisfaction with it, as well as with the draft guidelines as a whole. 87 There is thus no indication in this case that the European position in the Codex is stronger now than it used to be before EC accession. Nor can such an increase in strength be excluded though, given that the European negotiating position has itself softened in the meantime, and the chances for a harder stance to be successful in the current setting can only be speculated about.
With a view to future research, it might be worthwhile to follow up on other long-standing conflictual issues such GM-food regulation, so as to find out to what extent outcomes are influenced by the EC's negotiating positions at different points in time, and especially before and after its accession to the Codex. Odds are, however, that there will always be some confounding factors -such a change in negotiating position, as above -which makes a quasi-experimental before-after comparison impossible. In addition, therefore, further research could try to assess international influence with more direct reference to outcomes, i.e. standards adopted by the Codex and their relation to pre-existing European standards, going beyond individual high-profile conflicts. The Commission claims that there are "very few cases" where existing EU standards may have to be changed as a consequence of new Codex standards, and apart from aflatoxins in nuts, only one other case is explicitly mentioned. 88 This is somewhat puzzling insofar as earlier analyses have found more examples of Codex standards which are significantly less stringent than parallel EU standards, sometimes allowing up to hundred times the amount of a particular substance in the food concerned (Eckert 1995: 381-2; Wetzig 2000: 94) . Prior to the entry into force of the SPS Agreement, this would not have had to bother European policy-makers very much, but under current conditions we should expect them to work determinedly towards the minimisation of such divergences. If the Commission's assessment of the status quo is correct, this would seem to suggest that European interests were quite successfully promoted in the Codex already before the EC's accession. In any case, the divergence or convergence of substantive standards provides a relatively objective indicator of international influence that ought to be exploited more systematically.
CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS STRATEGIC ACTORNESS IN THE EU'S EXTERNAL REGULATORY RELATIONS?
The conditions under which the EU can become a full-fledged actor on the international scene have received considerable attention among both political scientists (Knodt and Princen 2003; Carlsnaes, Sjursen, and White 2004; Meunier 2005; Bretherton and Vogler 2006) and legal scholars (Cannizzaro 2002; Griller and Weidel 2002; Eeckhout 2004; Cremona 2006) . Much of this analysis has focused on policy areas where "actorness" is either particularly difficult to achieve for institutional reasons, such as foreign and security policy under the member-state dominated "second pillar" of the EU, or where it is particularly highly developed, such as external trade policy. To date, the most important exception from this rule was environmental policy, where internal policies are of course highly integrated and the EU has consistently shown a high level of external activities, but external competencies are more muddled and coordination is more ad hoc than in trade policy (Jupille and Caporaso 1998; Golub 1999; Maier 2002; Rhinard and Kaeding 2006) . 89 In food-safety policy, the allocation of competencies between Community and member states is similarly complex, but the opportunity structures on the international level are different, In terms of international influence, there are also indications that the coordination effort is not entirely in vein. A systematic assessment of the effects of EC membership in this regard is difficult to perform and has not been accomplished here. But in addition to the anecdotal evidence of successful international negotiation reported above, there also seems to be a prevailing sense of satisfaction among member states. Initially, as we have seen, many of them held a somewhat ambivalent position, wanting to increase their common leverage in the Codex without granting the Commission additional powers. They did not quite manage to square the circle in that way, but the existing arrangements for the EC's participation in the Codex appear to be serving them well enough. For although these arrangements are foreseen to be reviewed at the request of a member state or the Commission, no such request has been made to date.
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From a practical point of view, other questions are in any event more important now than the net effects of membership on international negotiating power. The EC's Codex membership as such is not openly questioned any more from either inside or outside, and the attention consequently turns to the most effective way of using the existing opportunities.
What can be seen from the case studies above is that this task of maximising influence under the current institutional conditions is not least a strategic one. Generally speaking, the European institutions nowadays are quite aware of the need for strategic direction in the 89 For recent analyses of the EU's external relations in additional, previously neglected areas, see Woll (2006) on air transport and Mayer (2006) on energy policy, among others. 90 On this court case see above, at fn. 62. In the context of the EC's membership in the FAO, a conflict over the division of competence -in this case concerning the competence to negotiate and conclude an FAO fisheries agreement -was directly taken to the Court by the Commission (Case C-25/94, Commission v. Council). Its original proposal had been changed by the Coreper and Council to the benefit of member states, but was then reinstated by the Court (Govaere, Capiau, and Vermeersch 2004: 167) . 91 See Interinstitutional Arrangement (n. 40), Art. 6, for the review clause. "This arrangement reflects the special circumstances of Community participation in the Codex Alimentarius Commission and any of its subsidiary bodies and has no implications regarding other international organisations, including those of the United Nations system." 95 This makes sense as an attempt not to overburden a negotiating process which was already conflictual and complicated enough in itself. But it will hardly prevent the case of EC membership in the Codex from functioning as a potential model for participation in other international organisations, even if this function may not amount to legal precedence.
